


External Review of the Civil Society and Human Rights Network



Civil Society & Human Rights Network (CSHRN)

September 2011 – November 2011

Natalie Hicks & Abdul Moien Jawhary

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Natalie Hicks & Abdul Moien Jawhary

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List of Abbreviations

- AAN** – Afghanistan Analysts Network
- ACBAR** – Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
- ACKU** - Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University
- ACSF** – Afghanistan Civil Society Forum
- AIHRC** – Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
- ANP** – Afghan National Police
- AREU** – Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
- ASGS** – Ambassador’s Small Grants Scheme
- AWN** – Afghan Women’s Network
- BODs** – Board of Directors
- CBO** – Community Based Organisation
- CEDAW** - The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- CSHRN** – Civil Society and Human Rights Network
- CSO** – Civil Society Organisation
- DIHR** – Danish Institute of Human Rights
- DPO** – Disabled Persons Organisation
- EC** – European Commission
- GA** – General Assembly (of CSHRN)
- GED** – Gender Equity and Diversity
- GMA** – Good Morning Afghanistan
- GoA** – Government of Afghanistan
- IDLG** – Independent Directorate of Local Governance
- (I)NGO** – (International) Non Governmental Organisation

MAIL – Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock

MEL – Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

MOI – Ministry of Interior

MoJ – Ministry of Justice

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MoWA – Ministry of Women’s Affairs

NSP – National Solidarity Programme

SAFHR – South Asia Forum for Human Rights

SDC – Swiss Development Corporation

STP – Society for Threatened Peoples Switzerland

TA – Technical assistance

TLO – The Liaison Office

UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

1. Executive Summary

The Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) was formally established in 2004. At this time it received core funding from DANIDA and in 2005, SDC began to support the Network. In 2011, CSHRN is one of many networks and organisations that are predominantly dependent on international funding to promote a collective voice for civil society and the promotion of human rights in Afghanistan. The competition for resources between these organisations is stiff and a general lack of donor funding coordination has exacerbated this issue.

Competition is positive when it encourages organisations to be effective and relevant. It becomes negative when organisations duplicate their work and dilute their collective voice. It was observed that all the major civil society networks were engaging with the same ministries, at the same entry points and with congruent goals but were mainly doing so individually rather than collectively. This serves to fracture a civil society voice and decrease impact. However, cooperative spirit is showing signs of improving in 2010-2011. Of particular note is the growing relationship between CSHRN and the Human Rights Support Unit (HRSU) in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ).

CSHRN has an urban-centric implementing model but it is able to occupy an interesting position within the Afghan state-society context. It has been able to work with both a largely urbanised civil society and with the weak but controlling central Government of Afghanistan (GoA). It has operated not just as a human rights watchdog but at times, as a partner with state officials at the province and national level. This 'bridging' role between civil society *writ large* and the government places the Network at an important nexus between state and society in Afghanistan. It is hoped that CSHRN can consolidate on these linkages in the future to work successfully with duty bearers and rights holders in a conflict sensitive fashion.

Although CSHRN has established some functioning and democratic internal structures such as the General Assembly, and Evaluation and Statement Committees, there is a critical need for an independent oversight mechanism that could be formed by donors, government and other CSOs. This would mean revitalising the currently defunct Steering Committee. Nevertheless, the CSHRN structure has been a useful model that has been replicated by a number of the member organisations. Currently the overall Networks structure is overly centralised which is placing an onerous burden of work on the Secretariat in Kabul and is under-utilising of the skills in the regional

offices. It is recommended that CSHRN would be more efficient and effective if some roles and responsibilities were decentralised to the four regional offices.

At the end of December 2011 (the end of Phase III funding), CSHRN will assume financial and project management responsibilities from the Danish Institute of Human Rights (DIHR). However, at this time, the Review Team has concluded that CSHRN will not have the capacity to function independently in key capacity areas such as fundraising and human rights technical knowledge. There will undoubtedly be a sharp learning and responsibility curve for CSHRN as the DIHR Project Manager transitions into an advisory role in 2012 but this will likely make CSHRN more durable in the longer term. It is recommended that this evolution should be managed by establishing key benchmarks during the transition process.

When assessing CSHRN's contribution to strengthening the role of civil society in promoting stability and democracy in Afghanistan, it must be acknowledged that the operating environment is extremely complex and dynamic. However, the Network has been able to establish some processes that *may contribute* to a stable and democratic outcome in Afghanistan. These processes include an iterative dialogue with national and regional state institutions which may help to develop a functional social contract between the GoA and its citizens. CSHRN has also hosted a large number of debates on different thematic issues in Kabul and in the regions. Although these debates are largely inclusive of only well-educated participants, with a predisposition to learn more about human rights, these debates are still important processes. They enable different elements of civil society to come together, including youth, in a safe space for dialogue. In a context such as Afghanistan, creating safe spaces for dialogue is important. It is also meaningful that CSHRN can connect and foster a rising curve of interest in human rights in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the establishment of the Violence against Women Committee in Herat is initiating an embryonic process to reach out to traditional village elders and religious leaders.

The logframe outputs and broader goals of the strategic plan were too ambitious for the size and capacity of the Secretariat in Phase III. It is alarming to see that although some staff growth is envisaged in Phase IV, the planned activities and outputs are even more ambitious. It is strongly recommended that CSHRN focuses on a few outcomes and sectors and executes these focus areas well. CSHRN needs to be vigilant against mission creep and also applying for project money that is beyond the implementation capacities of the Network. This can damage the effectiveness and reputation of any organisation.

The Review Team also assessed CSHRN's operations through a lens of what is 'good enough' for the context that CSHRN is operating in. It was concluded that as a priority, the overall monitoring, evaluation and learning system and impact measurement process needs improving. It is proposed that M&E at CSHRN should be undertaken in a mindset that views this as a valuable process for learning and improving internally rather than simply satisfying donor reporting systems. Importantly, CSHRN needs to provide evidence (qualitative, quantitative and anecdotal) to support their reporting to donors and to enhance an internal learning process for the Network.

Institutional evolution in Phase III has been most notable in three areas. First is the increased technical capacity of some member organisations. Second is the evident flexibility of CSHRN's internal structures that have enabled it to effectively respond to required changes such as the re-registration process with the GoA. CSHRN has also been able to attract some project funding. However, the Network remains vulnerable since it has not successfully explored other sources of core funding beyond SDC and Denmark. Furthermore, the Network is exhibiting symptoms of over-reach. It is strongly recommended that CSHRN rationalises the Phase IV proposal to consolidate its gains rather than plan for an ambitious expansion.

Lessons from Afghanistan are important not only in the Afghan context but also to programmers and policy-makers who will engage in similar contexts in other countries. The External Review highlights four key areas for donor consideration in regard to future civil society programming: Improved coordination among the international donor community and greater consideration to OECD DAC principles of engaging in fragile states; programming at the context and working in the context; linking state-building and civil society support mechanisms; and the importance of supporting civil society as a process and not a project

2. Introduction

2.1 Background of CSHRN

The genesis of the Civil Society and Human Right Network (CSHRN) was in the early aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001/2002.¹ The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and Afghan civil society activists identified a need to collectively promote human rights in Afghanistan. Although active civil society networks such as the Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) had already been established, it was thought that a new network was needed to fulfil a niche focus on human rights.

CSHRN was formally founded in 2004. At this time it received core funding from DANIDA and in 2005, SDC began to support the Network. Throughout this period, DIHR has provided project management and technical assistance to the Network. From 2005 – 2010, the Society for Threatened Peoples Switzerland (STP) also provided institutional capacity building support. CSHRN also receives small amounts of project funding from other donors. Projects are mainly implemented by the member organisations with support from the Secretariat in Kabul and regional offices. In three sequential funding phases, the Network has grown in terms of membership, geographic expertise, and national outreach. In 2011, the Network has 91 Members. In addition to the national-level Secretariat which is based in Kabul, four regional offices have been established in Mazar Sharif, Herat, Bamyan, and Jalalabad to further the coordination of activities throughout Afghanistan.

CSHRN is guided by a vision which is “a society based on democracy and the rule of law in accordance with human rights, and a society, where all people are aware of their rights and claim them through the rule of law.”² The “mission is to establish a capable human rights movement through strengthening of rights based civil society and by promoting human rights values, monitoring the human rights situation and disseminating information and by influencing policies in order to reach a society based on democracy, rule of law in accordance with human rights for all males and females in Afghanistan.”³

¹ CSHRN transferred its registration from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Economy in 2011. This required a name change to the Civil Society and Human Rights Organisation. However, CSHRN continues to be referred to as a network rather than an organisation. This report refers to CSHRN and the Network interchangeably.

² CSHRN Strategy Document – Updated March 2011.

³ *Ibid.*

2.2 The Situation of CSHRN within the Afghan State-Society Context

Civil society in Afghanistan can be conceptualised into two broadly different groups.⁴ The first of these are referred to as “quasi traditional groups” and consist of long standing patron-client relationships, religious groups, and neighbourhood Shuras (which do not encompass the new Shuras established through the National Solidarity Programme).⁵ The characteristics of these groups tend to be relationships built at a grassroots level and a plurality of forms that penetrate all areas of Afghanistan. The second group are more recent constructs in Afghanistan, characterised by Western liberal-democratic values and largely encompass educated and urbanised citizens. This latter group are significantly dependent on international funding for their existence.

CSHRN fits more closely into the second model of civil society groupings in Afghanistan. This does have implications for the operating model, activities, sustainability and outreach of the Network. CSHRN conducts most of its activities in Kabul and the major cities of Mazar, Herat, Jalalabad and Bamyan City and it implicitly relies on information filtering down to the district and village levels. This is a top down and urban-centric implementing model. Although there are some strong grassroots activist networks such as Disabled People’s Organisations and Veterans Groups, CSHRN does not mobilise through such grassroots networks. Given the security and resource constraints, and values of the Network, the urban-centric implementation model is realistic for the context. However, there is a need to clearly articulate the outreach limitations of this model. This issue is explored in more detail in Section 4.2.2.

CSHRN is one of many networks and organisations that are predominantly dependent on international funding to promote a collective voice for civil society and the promotion of human rights in Afghanistan. The competition for resources between these organisations is stiff and at times has fuelled a negative type of competition which has hindered genuine cooperation to work towards shared goals. The role of donor programming and funding arrangements in fuelling this competition is considered in more depth in Section 5.

A weak but controlling central Government is often competing with civil society for space rather than seeking genuine cooperation.⁶ CSHRN has been able to work within this context not just as a human rights watchdog but at times, as a partner with state officials at the province and national level. This ‘bridging’ role between civil society *writ large* and the government places the Network at

⁴ Susanne Schmeidl, 2009, “Civil Society and State-Building in Afghanistan.” Pp.102-127 in Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Robert Finn (eds.) Building State and Security in Afghanistan. Princeton University: Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS) and the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) Study series p.6.

⁵ *Ibid*, p 6.

⁶ *Ibid* p. 14-15.

an important nexus between the state and society in Afghanistan. In Phase IV, CSHRN may wish to consolidate the linkages it has been developing with organisations closely linked to duty bearers such as the HRSU or AIHRC.

2.3 Objectives of the Review

The overall objective of the External Review is “to assess, from a results-based perspective, the key achievements to date of CSHRN and enable SDC, CSHRN and other key stakeholders to record specific lessons that could benefit future interventions in support and mobilization of CSOs [civil society organisations] in Afghanistan and other countries with similar conditions.” This Review has also taken into account the findings and recommendations of the previous External Review which was conducted in July 2008. There are four key areas of assessment:

- (i) To what extent are CSHRN activities attaining the intended outputs specified in the project documents logframe? (effectiveness and relevance)**
- (ii) How efficient is the project approach to meet the expected outputs? (efficiency and sustainability)**
- (iii) Coordination and Institutional arrangements**
- (iv) Document lessons learned and best practices for future similar interventions in Afghanistan and elsewhere**

The period of assessment is January 2009 – July 2011 which encompasses most of SDC’s Phase III funding. However, given the broad scope of the assessment areas (and sub-questions), the Review Team has assessed the Network and context before January 2009 and reviewed the sustainability of CSHRN after the completion of Phase III funding in December 2011.

The outputs of this External Review are two-fold. The Review Team presented a participatory debriefing in Kabul on October 18th to the main stakeholders (SDC, Embassy of Denmark, CSHRN Secretariat, and DIHR). The second output is this report which will provide a comprehensive assessment of CSHRN with a clear set of recommendations. A full set of TORs for the Review is provided in Annex 1.

2.4 Methodology

The review was conducted over a one month period in Kabul (23rd September – 21st October 2011). The team was comprised of Natalie Hicks (international expert) and Abdul Moien Jawhary (national expert).

The Review Team conducted 41 group and individual meetings with 95 CSHRN stakeholders including:

- National and international policy makers (national and sub- national levels)
- Donor agencies / UN
- Afghan civil society networks, organisations and activists
- (I)NGO's
- Media
- National and international lawyers
- National and international academics
- CSHRN staff, members and partners
- CSHRN Board and Committee Members (past and present)
- DIHR staff members working with CSHRN

The Review Team chose to sample the Network regional activities in Herat and Bamyan. The Central Highlands offered some interesting insights owing to the newly established Network office, the relative homogeneity of the ethnic composition, and the challenges posed by the geographic context of the region. Bamyan province is also unique since it has the only female governor in Afghanistan. Herat also offered some valuable insights, particularly in regard to the Network's Violence against Women Campaign. Both sampling sites shared three factors in common: the relative level of good security, the transitional security arrangements from international to national forces, and a high number of returnee citizens from Iran and Pakistan.

The interview sample aimed to eliminate some level of bias by interviewing respondents suggested by CSHRN, SDC and also interviewing relevant people known to the Review Team. The reviewers also included interviews with respondents who were known to hold critical views of CSHRN. At all stages of the research, information was triangulated through further meetings and referencing to CSHRN documentation. A full interview list is provided in Annex 2.

A wide scope of CSHRN and donor material was also reviewed including, *inter alia*, financial reports and donor reports, strategy and planning documents, previous evaluations and assessments, the CSHRN website, library resources, and CSHRN publications.

The methodology of this review was conducted on similar principles to an organisational evaluation. It is referred to as a "review" rather than "evaluation" to distinguish the broad scope of the overall assessment, the largely qualitative nature of the methodology, and the constructive objective of the

report which posits concrete recommendations rather than providing a simple critique of CSHRN's operating model and outputs.

3. Effectiveness and Relevance

3.1 Internal Structure and Capacity

3.1.1 Democratic and functioning structures

Although there are concerns in regard to independent financial oversight, generally speaking, the Network has an internal democratic and professional structure. The general Assembly (GA) is comprised of all the member organisations and serves as the chief decision-making body on issues such as strategy and it meets once per year.⁷ The principle of one member, one vote, helps to mitigate any undue influence of large Kabul-based member organisations. In practice, some CSHRN stakeholders did indicate that they felt that the larger, Kabul-based (or more active members) such as Good Morning Afghanistan (GMA) did have an informal influence on agenda setting in CSHRN.

The Statement Committee which is comprised of member representatives is slowly emerging as a useful organ in raising awareness on key human rights issues in Afghanistan through the issuance of public statements and declarations. It is anticipated by CSHRN that the activities of the Statement Committee will grow in Phase IV. In line with this strategy, the Review Team would caution that CSHRN needs to be vigilant in its risk strategy when releasing public statements that may run contrary to the GoA's position. Furthermore, wherever possible, CSHRN should try to release joint statements with other networks such as Afghanistan Civil Society Forum (ACSF), Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and Afghanistan Women's Network (AWN) in order to generate maximum impact. It was noted during the review period that a number of member organisations have multiple memberships with different networks. These members reported that they felt that at times they could not wholly support a CSHRN position owing to their allegiance with another network which was taking a different stance on an issue.⁸

The Evaluation Committee was established recently and is mandated to vet all new membership submissions. This is an important function to CSHRN since clearly; a network is only as strong and good as its members. Currently the Evaluation Committee Members primarily appraise new applicants on criteria relating to their organisational constitutions and acquisition of a government registration. A small number of applicants have been refused membership due to weaknesses in these areas. There is a case to be made that the Evaluation Committee should explore more deeply into the mission, activities, and reputation of organisations seeking membership. In a highly

⁷ It should be noted that CSHRN Secretariat informed the Review Team, that in order to reduce costs, they are planning to hold the GA once every two years.

⁸ This was predominantly the case with members who had an affiliation also with AWN.

politicised and insecure operating environment, it is critical that all members are known to share the same values and ethics. Through a number of interviews with members and organisations seeking membership, the Review Team recognises that a powerful motivation for membership is the expectation of resources. It is therefore important that the Evaluation Committee and CSHRN more broadly, is very transparent with new members in regards what it can provide in terms of resources and capacity development for members to garner their own resources.

The ultimate oversight of CSHRN is conducted by the Board of Directors (BODs). The mandate of the BODs is outlined clearly in a terms of reference. Some Board Members have contributed well to furthering the mission of CSHRN by conducting regional monitoring trips and representing the Network at national and international events. However, the Evaluation Team has two concerns vis-a-vis the financial scrutiny and oversight role of the Board. Firstly, past and current Board Members have conveyed contradictory perspectives to the Review Team in regard to how closely they monitor financial reports or in some cases, claim that they were not given reports to review. Secondly, the Board is currently populated by member and partner organisations that are benefiting from the resources available to CSHRN. This is seemingly a conflict of interest. Therefore there is a critical need for an independent oversight mechanism that could be formed by donors, government and other CSOs.

In fact, CSHRN documentation refers to the existence of a Steering Committee which is tasked with monitoring finance and is comprised of donors and DIHR. In practice, this committee is not in existence and there are no terms of reference to define its role. Therefore the Review Team would recommend that CSHRN reviews the role and membership of this currently defunct committee, concurrently with the role of the Board, and takes steps to introduce an independent oversight body. Given that pecuniary responsibilities will be transferred from DIHR to CSHRN in Phase IV, it is critical that CSHRN establishes clear functional responsibilities for the Steering Committee and Board of Directors.

The CSHRN model has been replicated by a number of member organisations. The internal evaluation which was conducted by CSHRN in 2011 was a reasonably good step in driving a culture of self-improvement and learning. It may be questioned as to whether the structure and procedures of CSHRN are donor-driven rather than being a model driven by national norms and expectations. However, given that CSHRN hopes to continue to attract international funding well into the future, these systems are necessary for the international donor community.

3.1.2 The Secretariat and Regional Offices

The Secretariat is the primary executing body of CSHRN and *inter alia* coordinates the GA and Committees, manages the regional offices, supports implementing members, and engages in activities that further the ambitious five strategic outcomes outlined in the 2011-2015 strategic plan. This places a large burden of work upon the small Secretariat. The regional offices submit a three-month action plan for Secretariat approval and conduct training, capacity building, and coordination activities in their respective regions.

It is the opinion of the Review Team that this current model is overly centralised and CSHRN could be more efficient if greater authority was decentralised to the regional offices. Firstly, the action plans can be framed, reviewed, and evaluated on a six-monthly basis. This will reduce the workload in Kabul and also give greater autonomy to the regional offices to plan longer term work. It is also proposed that members who are implementing activities submit standardised reports to the regional offices rather than Kabul. In this way, the regional management can respond quickly and with more effectiveness to member organisations in their areas. It was the finding of this Review Team that the offices in Herat and Bamyan City have the capacity and will to take on greater responsibilities and that the Secretariat in Kabul is currently over stretched in its workload. However, it is proposed that if CSHRN decides to decentralise some further responsibilities, there are more fundamental issues that need to be addressed first such as instigating a systematic Monitoring Evaluation and Learning System (MEL) throughout the Network. This issue is explored in Section 4.2.1.

3.1.3 Capacity to function independently by the end of 2011

The first outcome outlined in the Phase III logframe is to “consolidate CSHRN as a professional and sustainable human rights network for coordination and cooperation among human rights and civil society organisations.” One of the indicators used to measure this outcome is that “CSHRN has the capacity to function independently by the end of 2011.” Indeed, recent Phase III donor reports and the proposal submitted to SDC for Phase IV funding indicate that CSHRN believes it does now have this capacity. However, capacity is a broad term which includes the following five sectors: (i) Finance & administration; (ii) Relationships with the international community (iii) Fundraising; (iv) Human rights technical knowledge; (v) Institutional leadership and management skills. These capacities have been accessed in turn by the Review Team:-

(i) Finance & administration

In 2011 CSHRN enhanced and simplified their financial management systems and these are user-friendly and appropriate to service the network in its current form. Cash transfers to the provincial

offices are well accounted for on both transfer and receiving ends. In terms of financial accounting and reporting, the Review Team does not foresee difficulties in transferring financial management from DIHR to CSHRN in terms of managing *potential* future SDC and Danish grants for Phase IV.

Two areas for CSHRN review in regard to finance and administration is firstly to ensure that there is a systematic data storage system. Currently finance, administration and programmatic documentation are recorded in a haphazard fashion and are difficult to access. The overall information management system has room for improvement.

A second area that will require forethought and strategic thinking in the near future is in relation to CSHRN's intention to procure multiple types of project grants requiring different formats of reporting and accounting. CSHRN has managed small project grants such as the Ambassadors Small Grants Programme. So far, these small projects do not seem to have been too challenging for CSHRN. However, in the event that the Network procures large grants from complex donors such as the EC, it will need to ensure that it has the systems in place to manage these grants in accordance with the stipulated requirements. Of particular importance is ensuring that implementing members have the capacity to competently report and account on their activities. In this scenario, the regional offices can play an important role in ensuring that members can report as well as implement. It is proposed that all future proposals are subject to a thorough vetting process and a go/no go procedure by the Secretariat senior management and possibly including the Board members should the budget exceed \$500,000. An example of a proposal checklist and go/no go policy is included in Annex 5 of this report.

(ii) Relationships with the international community

Relationships with the international community are more significant than simply an exercise in garnering resources. The international community embraces policy makers, donors, development practitioners, media and academics – most of who are eager to understand more about the Afghan context. To some extent, the DIHR Project Manager, Mr. Malek Sitez has been able to connect with some of these actors. However, CSHRN could have a greater impact and profile in this arena. Random sampling by the Review Team indicates that its profile with a diverse cross section of the international community is still low.

There is a small but growing culture of blaming the international community for perceived mistakes that they have made in their policies and programming in Afghanistan. If this is the case, there is a correspondent responsibility on national organisations to help inform and support some of these international actors to be able to make better informed decisions. If CSHRN wishes to improve in this

capacity, as the Secretariat has indicated to the Review Team, then two steps will need to be taken. First, a simple communication strategy will need to be developed that can guide how CSHRN wants to engage with the international community. The second step will be to identify a person with strong English and networking skills to undertake responsibility for this task. The current CSHRN Executive Coordinator, Mr. Naim Nazari, does not have the linguistic capacity to engage in this activity.

(iii) Fundraising

The previous CSHRN External Review conducted in July – August 2008 observed a significant degree of complacency in CSHRN’s approach to fundraising.⁹ This review Team did not observe such a degree of complacency in 2011 and a number of projects are pending donor decisions. However, there are key areas for improvement in CSHRN’s fundraising approach. It is expected that CSHRN will still rely on DIHR’s technical capacity to help write proposals in light of STP’s withdrawal from the programme in 2010. However, there is currently confusion among senior Secretariat staff over basic processes such as the difference between a concept note and proposal. A recent concept paper submitted for significant funding for 1325 activities was not of a high standard. Similarly, an email exchange between a senior Secretariat staff member and donor concerning questions that the donor had in relation to project activities in Parwan province was not conducive to building a strong relationship of trust with the donor. It is not proposed by the Review Team that CSHRN should be subservient to donor demands but rather that greater effort is put into building iterative relationships of trust and respect between donor and implementing partner.

CSHRN does need to approach fund raising in a more strategic fashion. There are some easy tools that it can employ to help it be more strategic such as maintaining and monitoring a ‘fundraising pipeline’ and regularly updating/monitoring an ‘expressions of interest pipeline’. These tools are described in more detail in Annexes 6 and 7 of this report. More immediately, CSHRN should now be preparing for the Civil Society Trust Fund which is being established and will be administered under the auspices of the British Council. It is hoped that CSHRN will play an active part in the forthcoming forum that the Trust Fund will be holding in November 2011. In 2012, the Trust Fund will be opening calls for core funding. This is an opportunity that CSHRN must prioritise given the increasingly competitive environment for dwindling international resources in Afghanistan.

⁹ Jeremy Condon & Farid Tana, “DANIDA and the Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation in Partnership with the Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN): Project Review, July/August 2008,” p.20.

(V) Human rights technical knowledge

CSHRN staff and some member organisations at Kabul-level have demonstrated significant advances in Phase III in regard to their human rights knowledge and in particular, international human rights values as they relate to Islam. The role that Mr. Sitez and DIHR have played in this capacity building is not to be underestimated. At the regional level, this technical knowledge is not as advanced. Some stakeholders, members, and prospective members did not appear to understand fundamental issues relating to The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and 1325, despite attending training sessions.

What is of significance is the pivotal role that the DIHR Project Manger has played in engaging in high profile human rights debates in and on Afghanistan. To a large extent he has evolved into the 'face of the Network'. It is not clear in Phase IV how much Mr. Sitez will step back from these public debates and enable key figures such as the Executive Coordinator, Deputy Director (Mr. Wazir Ahmad Khorami) and even Board Members to take on the public face for human rights advocacy in CSHRN. Furthermore, there is likely to be a continued need for DIHR to support CSHRN on international developments on human rights and lessons learned from other countries. However, this support can largely be provided remotely.

(v) Institutional leadership and management skills

In Phase IV, full project management will be transferred to the Secretariat from DIHR. Mr. Sitez will then transition into an advisory role. It is unclear how easy or smooth this transition will be in light of a large degree of reliance on Mr. Sitez as a Project Manager in Phase III. The Project Manager's networking skills, human rights technical skills, and managerial skills have been the backbone of CSHRN since its inception and his transition will have to be managed carefully with senior Secretariat staff needing to step-up into more visible roles. The Secretariat staff are a competent team and if they are given the space, they can take on more management responsibility.

What can be concluded is that CSHRN will not have the capacity to function with full independence by the end of 2011. There will hopefully be a sharp learning and responsibility curve for the Network as the Project Manager transitions in 2012 and this will likely make CSHRN more durable in the longer term.

3.2 Promoting Stability and Deepening Democracy in Afghanistan

When assessing CSHRN's contribution to strengthening the role of civil society in promoting stability and democracy in Afghanistan, it must be acknowledged that the operating environment is

extremely complex and dynamic. Furthermore, as Section 2.2 has already highlighted, programming for ‘democracy’ in Afghanistan for many donors has meant sponsoring new types of civil society organisations that are imbued with western values and norms. CSHRN is a product of this programming.

One way to assess whether CSHRN is contributing to democracy in Afghanistan is to look at the *processes* that it is engaging in that *may contribute* to a stable and democratic outcome in Afghanistan. One such process is an iterative dialogue with national and regional state institutions. Over time this engagement may contribute to a functional social contract between the GoA and its citizens.

Another process is awareness raising and education on human rights. Although the outreach and conflict sensitive nature of CSHRN’s work in this process has limitations (and is discussed in later sections of the report) educating rights holders is an important basis for a democratic and fair society.

CSHRN has hosted a large number of debates on different thematic issues in Kabul and in the regions. Although these debates are largely inclusive of only well-educated participants, with a predisposition to learn more about human rights, these debates are still important processes. They enable different elements of civil society to come together, including youth, in a safe space for dialogue. In a context such as Afghanistan, creating safe spaces for dialogue is important. It is also meaningful that CSHRN can connect and foster a rising curve of interest in human rights in Afghanistan.

One of the fundamental issues that donor programmers and civil society organisations like CSHRN have to determine is how to engage with traditional elements of Afghan civil society who are quite often viewed by the former as antithetical to the development of democracy. Until this process begins in earnest, there will be a continued tension that will undermine broad civil society building in Afghanistan. One positive step in this process by CSHRN has been the establishment of the Violence against Women Committee in Herat which is taking embryonic steps to reach out to traditional village elders and religious leaders.

3.3 Impact of the Programme on National policies and State-building

CSHRN has had some success engaging with the GoA at a national level. The most notable of these engagements (and directly related to Outcome Four) is CSHRN’s contribution to the formulation of an Access to Information law. This law is now under committee review. Other contributions to

national policies have been broad civil society support for the Peace Jirga and contributions to agenda-setting for the Bonn II Conference in December 2012.

CSHRN also participates in a number of national-level committees such as the Advisory Board on Labour Law Implementation, the High Media Council, and the Civil Society Committee for the Bonn Conference. A full list of these committees is provided in Annex 3. It is hard to ascertain how cooperative, functional, and impactful these committees are in reality. The Review Team spoke to a number of respondents who were doubtful as to the impact of civil society organisations achieving any genuine influence through these forums. Genuine cooperation amongst the large civil society networks and organisations does, at times, seem to be lacking and negative competition between them was routinely underscored in interviews during the review period.

Competition is positive when it encourages organisations to be effective and relevant. It becomes negative when organisations duplicate their work and dilute their collective voice. It was observed that all the major civil society networks were engaging with the same ministries, at the same entry points and with congruent goals but were mainly doing so individually rather than collectively. This serves to fracture a civil society voice and decrease impact.

CSHRN has had more obvious success working with state institutions at the provincial level. Working with the police and provincial councils, CSHRN has helped to contribute to an enabling environment for the provision of human rights in the provinces visited by the Review Team. The Violence against Women Committee in Herat is an example of how civil society organisations can engage with a cross section of state institutions in order to start to address the violation of women's rights in Herat. One of the reasons that CSHRN has been more effective in engaging at the regional level (Herat and Bamyan) is that core funding provided by SDC and the Danish Embassy has enabled CSHRN to establish permanent offices in these locations and thus maintain regular interactions. Other networks, for example AWN, are more reliant on project funding and are unable to establish long-term coordination offices. However, it should be noted that in Bamyan and Parwan provinces, CSHRN was observed by some respondents to have weak relations with the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA).¹⁰ The Review Team explicitly asked to meet a representative of this Ministry in Herat but was only able to meet with an ex-official from MoWA.

¹⁰ This was reported to the Review Team by the Governor of Bamyan. In the case of Parwan, this was report by an external evaluator of the 1325 Ambassador's Small Grants Programme and the Review Team triangulated this information with email correspondence between the Secretariat Liaison Officer and donor representative.

4. Project Efficiency, Coordination and Institutional Arrangements

4.1 Assessment of Outputs

Outcomes	Outputs	Assessment of outputs
<p>1. To consolidate CSHRN as a professional and sustainable human rights network for coordination and cooperation among human rights and civil society organisations</p>	<p>1. CSHRN has a clear strategy in regard to vision, mission and membership which is regularly updated</p> <p>2. CSHRN has a well functioning and sustainable management, administrative and information exchange system;</p> <p>3. CSHRN member organisations are well informed about each other's fields of works and have access to attractive and professionally organised human rights resource centres in Kabul and the regions;</p>	<p>1. In response to recommendations from the previous External Review, the vision and mission statements were revised in Phase III. The vision statement is aspirational but this is not viewed as a problem, if the mission statement is slightly revised to provide more concrete steps that CSHRN will take to realise this vision. It is suggested that CSHRN reviews a cross section of vision and mission statements from other organisations, should they wish to re-visit this fundamental part of their strategy for 2011-2015.</p> <p>There is continued need for vigilance to ensure that members are actively engaged in the mission of CSHRN and not driven solely by resource expectations</p> <p>2. As highlighted in Section 3.1.3, the management and administrative systems are in transition from DIHR to Network management at the end of 2011. In reality, CSHRN will still require external support in the capacities outlined in 3.1.3 but will also require the ex-Project Manager to provide space for the Secretariat to improve in the 5 identified capacity areas. As mentioned, there is a critical need to revitalise the Steering Committee to perform independent oversight of CSHRN.</p> <p>3. CSHRN has tried to improve linkages between the members and one effort in this direction has been the production of a CD on member profiles and activities.</p> <p>The resource centre in Kabul is quite well stocked with relevant human rights material. However, as a cost effective measure, it is proposed that CSHRN tries to form a closer linkage with the Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University (ACKU) which is close to the Secretariat office and has significant and growing resources that will be relevant for CSHRN members. CSHRN could also link up with the</p>

	<p>6. CSHRN has a broad base of donors for long term funding and is able to recover some of its costs</p> <p>7. The Secretariat is correctly and sufficiently staffed in order to respond to the increasing demands</p>	<p>more than this. It is marked by shared activities and an understanding that joining together can create a stronger impact. It is actively looking for synergies between their programmes</p> <p>6. As highlighted in Section 3.1.3, CSHRN has been more proactive in fundraising efforts in Phase III but this assessment relates to project funding rather than core funding. CSHRN cannot be said to currently have a broad base of donors for long-term funding and the Review Team is not aware of any core funding proposals to donors other than Denmark and SDC.</p> <p>7. The logframe outputs and broader goals of the strategic plan were too ambitious for the size and capacity of the Secretariat in Phase III. It is alarming to see that although some staff growth is envisaged in Phase IV, the planned activities and outputs are even more ambitious. It is strongly recommended that CSHRN focuses on a few outcomes and sectors and does these focus areas well. CSHRN needs to be vigilant against mission creep, for example, doing technical human rights monitoring in detention centres in Phase III and also applying for project money that is beyond the implementation capacities of the Network. This can damage the effectiveness and reputation of any organisation.</p>
<p>2. To increase the capacities of member and partner organisations, in particular in the regions, in the field of human rights and institutional capacities, so that they improve the human rights culture in their respective areas</p>	<p>1. Manual on children rights developed and published in Dari and Pashto;</p> <p>2. A pool of continuously educated human rights trainers at the disposal of the member organisations</p> <p>3. Trainings of good quality on basic human rights, human rights monitoring and reporting mechanism, objectives and different methods of advocacy are available for member organisations</p>	<p>1. This output was not achieved in Phase III. Although this output is planned for Phase IV, the Review Team would recommend that CSHRN conducts a more thorough mapping to ensure that this manual is a clearly identified need in relation to the work of other organisations on child rights</p> <p>2. There is a pool of human rights trainers that have been made available to a large number of members in Phase III. However, there is no MEL system to monitor the continued relevance and multiplier effects of these trainings or importantly, the overall quality of the trainer and trainings. CSHRN reporting on these issues is largely quantitative rather than qualitative.</p> <p>3. The four training manuals (published in Dari) on transitional justice, international human rights principles, conflict resolution, and women’s rights have been used throughout Phase III and continue to be an important resource on</p>

	<p>4. Training and coaching provided to member organisations on institutional capacity building</p>	<p>human rights training for CSHRN. A brief overview of these manuals is provided in Annex 8. Despite CSHRN’s adoption of KAP monitoring of training sessions, there is no systematic M&E system to track the medium/longer term impact of these trainings</p> <p>Training on human rights monitoring and reporting mechanisms has been less evident and the Review Team questions whether CSHRN has the capacity to undertake this highly technical activity that is already serviced by a number of national and international organisations.</p> <p>The Review Team found that CSHRN has not devoted significant attention to making available different methods of advocacy for the member organisations. CSHRN activities are more focused on human rights training for the members rather than advocacy. The 2011-2015 strategy states that “The CSHRO organises advocacy on behalf of member organisations” which suggests that member organisations are not empowered by the CSHRN management to lead on different types of advocacy initiatives. However, it should be noted that in 2011, CSHRN has started a project where 300 women (100 women in Parwan, 100 women in Bamyan and 100 women in Kabul) were trained to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The women have all received advocacy trainings as part of this project. According to final progress report submitted to SDC in September 2011, “The presentation - and educational material ‘Advocacy in Practice’ has been developed by the educational section and trainers of CSHRN.”¹¹ Since this project has recently been evaluated by a set of independent evaluators, it has been suggested verbally that CSHRN contact the project officer at the Ambassadors Small Grants Programme to gain some insight in to the perceived strengths and weaknesses of this project.</p> <p>4. The CSHRN Secretariat has been proactive in institutional capacity building with some members. It has also been proactive in sharing prospective funding opportunities with the members. However, the Secretariat is cautioned to be vigilant in this area since it is already over stretched and resource generation should not become the key ‘pull-factor’ of why members wish to join the Network.</p>
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¹¹ Final progress Report to SDC, September 2011, p.12

	<p>4. High quality human rights information and information about CSHRN activities are available to a broad public through the CSHRN website in Dari and English and Pashto</p> <p>5. CSHRN provides high quality inputs on important current human rights issues</p>	<p>funding these activities.</p> <p>4. The information provided in English on the website needs updating and more attention paid to the English language before it can be considered a quality output. The information provided in Dari is much more comprehensive than the Pashtu or English versions. The Dari includes comprehensive information on radio programmes, reports, CSHRN statements and a helpful links section. However, it was noted that there was little financial transparency in regard to CSHRN's donors.</p> <p>The Review Team recommends that CSHRN takes two steps. Firstly, conduct regular reviews to check that the website is accessible on low bandwidth internet connections. Secondly, CSHRN may want to explore who are the main audiences for their website. If it is predominantly Pashtu and Dari speakers, the Network may wish to focus on quality outputs in these languages rather than develop the English pages.</p> <p>5. Since there is not a standardised MEL system, it is difficult for CSHRN to <i>prove</i> that it is providing high quality inputs on human rights issues. Certain activities have been effective such as the input on the Access to Information Law but these inputs remain piecemeal and anecdotal rather than telling a broader story in regard to the aggregate quality of CSHRN's inputs on current human rights issues. This issue was raised in the previous external review but does not seem to have been comprehensively addressed.</p>
<p>4. To ensure that the provision of information by the public administration to its citizens is an important topic on the political agenda (Access to information)</p>	<p>1. Round of dialogue on access to information hold with political parties, civil society, media, private sector and government, in the eastern, western, northern, and central regions by a competent CSHRN working group</p> <p>2. Draft law discussed in the parliament</p>	<p>1. CSHRN was able to mobilise a broad spectrum of stakeholders at the national and regional level (particularly in Mazar) in regard to this issue. However, while CSHRN certainly contributed to putting this issue high on the public and state agenda, the Review Team urges caution to CSHRN when reporting on this issue and share credit and stress collaboration rather than suggest that this was a solo activity of the Network.</p> <p>2. The development of the Access to Information Law has not been a smooth process. However, in May 2011 the new law has been submitted to the High Media Council of which CSHRN is a member. CSHRN should continue this constructive dialogue and augment it with strong advocacy tools to gain maximum impact.</p>

<p>5. To decrease violence in families in Herat city</p>	<p>1. Radio Programs are produced (January to June) (Killid, Mozhd) 2/month 2 hours</p> <p>2. Banners with key messages about family violence are hanged up in prominent places in Herat city</p> <p>3. Important stakeholders identified, contact established and maintained</p>	<p>1. These programmes were produced on schedule. CSHRN has claimed in their most recent SDC report that “The radio programs efficiently increased the knowledge of victims regarding services available for victims of family violence. The radio programs broadcasted through Radio Muzhda also played an important role in introducing the registration process for victims as well as the centres that victim of family violence can refer to.”¹² The Review Team did not see evidence produced through an M&E process that can prove these claims and it was not conflict sensitive for the Review Team to speak to victims during the review process. If the claims made by CSHRN are based on anecdotal evidence, then CSHRN should indicate that this is the case or provide evidence to support their reporting.</p> <p>2. This output was not produced because the provincial government outlawed such banners.</p> <p>3. This output was reached effectively with CSHRN being able to establish a Committee on Violence against Women with key government and civil society stakeholders. This Committee is now very proactive in reaching out through mullahs into the province regarding domestic violence. It is hoped that this Committee will sustain beyond 2011. It appears to be a low cost- high impact activity.</p> <p>The Review Team felt that the positive development of the Violence against Women Campaign in Herat is being under-played by CSHRN. It is recommended that a small brochure on lessons learned and successes is produced for national and international stakeholders. Using measurement tools such as Most Significant Change stories are useful ways to gather information for such publications.¹³</p> <p>It is also felt that CSHRN is not learning from this programme significantly and seeking to replicate this Committee in other operating areas.</p>
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¹² CSHRN Progress Report: January – June 2011, p.17.

¹³ Useful documentation on this type of evidence or story collection is – Rick Davies and Jess Dart, 2005, “The ‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) Technique: A guide to its Use,” (ADB, Manila); Olivier Serrat, 2005, “The Most Significant Change Technique,” (Knowledge Solutions, Manila).

4.2 Internal and External Issues Influencing the Achievement of the Project Outputs

4.2.1 Monitoring, evaluation, learning and impact measurement

In recent years global development organisations have invested considerable resources to try to measure the impact of their work and untangle the question of attribution. Measuring impact, however imprecise the science, is a key tool to demonstrate relevance and provide evidence that aid money is being used effectively. Donor countries have a right to see value for their money. Being able to talk about the impact of your work is also a good way to raise the profile of an organisation, which CSHRN is still trying to do.

Despite recommendations in the previous external review, CSHRN has not devoted many resources or attention to developing an M&E system that is linked to a genuine learning process or measuring ultimate impacts. Currently CSHRN only employs basic measurement tools such as recording the number of visitors to the website and resource centre and quantifying participation in training sessions and debates. Secretariat staff have pointed to the key role of SDC and Board Member fieldtrips in their M&E system. However, while these trips are undoubtedly useful, they are a supplementary, rather than systematic monitoring tool.

Since the previous external review, CSHRN has adopted the proposed Knowledge Attitude Practice (KAP) measurement instrument but this is only partially used immediately before and after some training sessions. Rolling and systematic monitoring of CSHRN activities on direct and indirect beneficiaries is poor and *ad hoc*. This is preventing CSHRN from being able to learn, adapt and capitalise on successful programme activities, such as the Violence against Women Campaign in Herat which potentially could have been a pilot model for the Network in other regions in Afghanistan. It is proposed that M&E at CSHRN should be undertaken in a mindset that views this as a valuable process for learning and improving internally rather than simply satisfying donor reporting systems.

Currently the donor reporting narrative to SDC can be quite unstructured and verbose. At times, this reporting also lacks evidence to prove some of the claims made in the reports. This may be indicative of the fact that there is not one person in the Secretariat who is taking sole responsibility for managing M&E and consolidating this information in a user friendly format for internal and external purposes. It is recommended that there should be a lead person on MEL, although it is not suggested that CSHRN at this time should invest resources in establishing this as a full time position or unit.

Through conversations with CSHRN staff and after a thorough review of the relevant documentation, it is proposed that CSHRN may want to review their overall project design and project logic before considering how to institutionalise a systematic MEL system. A generic project logic model is provided in Annex 9 to help guide this process in the future.

The Review Team also proposes that CSHRN defines their beneficiaries or 'impact populations' more clearly. Currently these are directly the member organisations and indirectly, the population of Afghanistan. For such a broad group of indirect beneficiaries it is almost impossible to measure any clear impact so a more defined impact population is required. It is recommended that CSHRN systematically addresses this issue in the concept stage of each project.

M&E, appraisals, and research processes in Afghanistan need to be executed with a sense of realism. The terms, "good enough in an imperfect world," "operated on minimum standards," and "remote monitoring" are terms that are frequently used in development circles in the country. This is particularly the case for monitoring in remote and insecure areas. A respondent who was recently part of the AWN survey team on 1325 issues in the Northeast of Afghanistan has explained to one member of the Review Team the critical dangers that both researchers and respondents face when asking and answering questions regarding women's rights in this region. Certainly *some* donors are not making this process any easier by demanding outputs such as photographs of beneficiaries and workshops. However, the question remains: What is "good enough" for the context that CSHRN is operating in? The Review Team would suggest that CSHRN implementing members should receive capacity building in this area so that they can recognise the importance of monitoring and use a standardised format which can be easily digested at the regional office and in Kabul. CSHRN can be expected to measure the impact of their training sessions on a rolling medium and long term basis, especially for sessions that are conducted in urban centres. Importantly, CSHRN needs to provide evidence (qualitative, quantitative and anecdotal) to support their reporting process to the donors and as an internal learning process for the Network.

4.2.2 Outreach

Outreach in this section is conceptualised in three ways. The first is in terms of geographic outreach. The second is outreach in relation to reaching out to work with the supply side (duty-bearers) and demand side (rights holders). The third is in regard to the broad spectrum of activities and interventions executed and planned by CSHRN.

1. Geographic outreach

CSHRN primarily focuses on reaching educated and urban populations. It does not have the structure or grassroots connections to meaningfully engage with people in the villages and more rural areas of Afghanistan. Since the Review Team was not able to conduct assessments outside of the cities, it is not known how far the radio programmes are reaching and impacting upon people in remoter districts and villages. It is understood that in Phase IV, the Network proposes to establish 'focal points' in provinces in the East, West, North and Central Highlands to enable a greater outreach. In this respect, the Review Team would recommend that CSHRN initiates two steps. The first step is to clearly identify the impact population in these areas and specifically tailor the training to the identified needs of this group. Secondly, if CSHRN is serious about reaching to a wider population outside the provincial towns, it will need to invest heavily in building relations with local village governance structures and pre-existing CBO's. Handicap International, which works at a local level on disability rights in Western and Northern Afghanistan undertakes a careful mapping of the social capital of CBO's and receptivity of traditional and state bodies before it commits to working in new districts and villages. CSHRN may also want to conduct a rapid appraisal of this type when thinking about outreach in Phase IV.

2. Working at the supply and demand sides

CSHRN inputs are predominantly focused on awareness raising, advocacy and human rights training. In a fragile and transitional context such as Afghanistan, there is a danger that the rights holders are saturated with information about their rights and where to claim but there is a lack of capacity and/or will from the duty bearers to provide these rights. This scenario can potentially cause deep frustration and *do harm*. Arguably, a significant causal factor leading to the high levels of female depression and self-immolation in Herat is amongst women who have been raised and educated in Iran and have returned to an environment that is less enabling in regard to women's rights.

CSHRN is aware of this dichotomy and does make continued efforts to work on the supply as well as the demand side. However, the Review Team urges vigilance to ensure that a balance is maintained. Some interesting tools have been developed by different organisations working in fragile states to

help ensure that they are constructively working at both sides of the equation. One example is the use of score cards whereby target populations assess the strengths and weaknesses of local duty bearers in their ability to protect and honour a spectrum of rights. Through this system, areas of weakness are clearly identified and it is then possible to focus on working on this identified area with the duty bearers. This tool must be used in a very conflict sensitive manner and is only possible where the implementer has gained the trust of both the citizens and the state. The Review Team recommends that CSHRN builds in some reflection time to explore such tools and lessons learned from other fragile states.¹⁴

3. Outreach but not over-reach

The Phase III logframe was extremely ambitious. Furthermore, the Network became engaged in activities and focus areas that seemed beyond their structural capacities such as detention monitoring and growing engagement on projects relating to 1325, violence against women, child's rights, and conflict resolution. These were concurrent to internal capacity building and coordination activities within CSHRN and working with the GoA on major pieces of legislation such as the Access to Information law. The Review Team has two concerns in relation to CSHRN's potential over reach. The first concern is that there is no evidence that it is doing any comprehensive needs assessments which would identify the relevance and demand for certain interventions. In the case of the proposed child's rights manual, the Review Team is not satisfied that CSHRN has mapped the other national and international organisations already working on this issue in Afghanistan. In the case of conflict resolution activities, the Review team is also not satisfied that CSHRN is aware of the other organisations and actors already conducting these activities. In regard to 1325, there are a large number of organisations working on this issue throughout Afghanistan but CSHRN does not seem aware of these other projects when planning their own activities. For example, the recent concept note submitted to the Canadian Embassy for \$ 597,543.88 (Canadian dollars) to work on 1325, included an activity to develop a baseline survey to study the situation of 1325 in Afghanistan. However, CSHRN does not seem aware that AWN has recently concluded a nationwide comprehensive survey on 1325 and is due to release the findings in October 2011.

The second concern is that rather than having a realistic niche focus in their programming, CSHRN is trying to be 'all things to all people'. The Phase IV proposal is perpetuating this problem into the next funding cycle. The aim to establish a new regional office in the southern region fits with CSHRN's ambition to be a national network but there is a strong case, in light of the dwindling aid money

¹⁴ A useful paper to review in this regard would be Richard Barge, "Learning from DFID's Governance and Transparency fund: Tools, Methods and Approaches," (Triple Line Consulting, June 2010).

available in Afghanistan, to *consolidate* the Network rather than *expand it*. The goal of establishing a regional human rights network is also over stretching CSHRN at the potential cost of consolidating its steady gains towards being a high profile, national network *inside* Afghanistan. In the case of establishing a regional network, CSHRN does not seem to be aware of existing networks in the region such as the South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR).¹⁵ It is the opinion of the Review Team that it is better to leverage change within existing networks rather than attempt to build new ones.

The Review Team posits that it is the responsibility of CSHRN and donors to ensure that comprehensive needs assessments are undertaken before projects are proposed and funded.

4.2.3 Conflict sensitivity

Understanding and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity principles is lacking in a large number of organisations operating in Afghanistan.¹⁶ This is a reasonably alarming situation given the fragile context in the country. CSHRN staff and members do not have a clear understanding of these principles. Although it should be noted that their human rights training does integrate Islamic values with universal human rights principles which does help to mitigate some potential conflict in human rights awareness raising in Afghanistan. There is a clear need for CSHRN staff and members to receive conflict sensitivity training. The Network may wish to approach other civil society and human rights organisations and explore joint opportunities for training with professional trainers/training organisations in the region.¹⁷ Alternatively, a technical adviser could increase the capacity of CSHRN in this area. This would include all staff and not only those who could participate in the external trainings.

4.2.4 Project design

The project design process at CSHRN could be strengthened and systemised. Currently it is predominantly driven by the Secretariat in Kabul rather than issues genuinely emerging from either the regions or from learning experiences engendered through a good MEL system. The design appears to be driven by a need for funding to sustain the Network rather than a credible needs assessment process.

¹⁵ It may be that some of these regional networks are not appropriate partners for CSHRN but it is important that CSHRN does do a thorough mapping of what is out there first.

¹⁶ This has been observed during the Team Leader's previous work and evaluations conducted in Afghanistan and confirmed in conversations with other development practitioners in Afghanistan.

¹⁷ An excellent regional training organisation is the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (based in Cambodia and led by Emma Leslie). National trainers include Mohammad Suleman, Ahmed Fahim Hakim and Hamidullah Natiq.

In order to systemise and improve the current project design process at CSHRN, the Review Team proposes a checklist tool that can be used to ensure a more comprehensive approach is taken. This checklist is attached in Annex 4.

4.2.5 Security and the operating environment

The external operating environment is complex, challenging, and insecure. A significant number of respondents informed the Review Team that efforts to implement human rights activities in the highly insecure and rural areas were futile until a reasonable level of security could be provided in these areas. These observations seem to validate CSHRN's urban-centric implementing model. However, civil society groups, national stakeholders, and international development programmers should be cautious. If the security situation does worsen and development programming becomes increasingly confined to the relatively secure urban pockets, there is a risk of widening the development gap and thus the potential for conflict between urban and rural areas in Afghanistan.

The national policy environment in Afghanistan is highly politicised. The Review Team found no evidence to suggest that CSHRN is a politicised network with strong affiliations to a political group or position. It is important to recognise that any network or organisation which aims to initiate social and political change must have good connections with the GoA and have key entry points where it can enter dialogues and advocate for change.

During the review period a large number of respondents spoke about "fake" civil society groups. These groups are apparently sponsored by warlords, political groups, and foreign powers and are actively working to undermine genuine civil society organisations. This Review does not deny the existence of such groups but suggests that these groups should not be turned into a metaphorical 'bogey-man' who can be blamed for a plethora of ills in state-society relations in Afghanistan. In most states in the world, including the UK and USA, there are politicised think tanks and societal organisations that support particular political agendas and in some respects, this diversity of opinion and action is welcomed. In terms of the threat that the "fake" organisations may pose to CSHRN and others, this may be counterbalanced by the CSOs with shared visions and ethics collaborating together in a more genuine and effective manner.

4.3 Institutional Evolution

There has been evident institutional evolution of CSHRN in Phase III, despite the fact that CSHRN will not be able to function entirely independently of DIHR at the end of 2011. Institutional evolution has been most notable in the following areas:-

Attracting project funding has been a positive development for CSHRN with project grants from ICCO and ASGP. Although the Secretariat management understands the need to factor in overhead charges to project grants (at 7%), the Network is still dependent on core funding for its main operating and activity costs. The Review Team would encourage CSHRN not to refer to projects funded outside of SDC and Danish grants as “side projects” since this implicitly suggests a lower significance to these activities.

The flexible internal structures of CSHRN have enabled it to be able to effectively respond to required changes, for example in regard to the re-registration process with the GoA in 2011, the internal self-evaluation, partial adoption of the KAP tool while at the same time, maintaining an Afghan identity. The project management of DIHR has not significantly impacted on CSHRN’s identity as a national network.

The establishment and work of the Statement and Evaluation Committees has helped professionalise and raise the profile of the Network. However, the institutional confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the CSHRN Board and Steering Committee needs to be resolved.

The technical capacity of some member organisations has increased during Phase III which was anticipated in Outcome 1 and 2. However, the Review Team cautions the CSHRN Secretariat in Kabul not to become overly focused on internal capacity building at the cost of reaching indirect beneficiaries (the wider population outside of the Network).

4.4 Sustainability

During the review period, respondents were asked to speculate on where they saw CSHRN in five years time (2016). The majority of people found this a very difficult question to answer due to the highly uncertain security context in the country. Generally speaking, uncertainty in regard to the future has sometimes driven short term thinking and the desire for quick gains rather than a process approach to development initiatives in Afghanistan. However, CSHRN has been in the enviable position since 2004/2005 to have received reliable core funding from SDC and Denmark. The question is whether CSHRN has been able to use this time and funding to create a sustainable basis to reasonably expect a civil society and human rights culture to begin to flourish within the Afghan context?

In regard to the Network activities specifically, it is highly unlikely that activities will continue without international funding. Most of the members spoken to during the review period felt that in the absence of donor money, membership fees and goodwill would not be sufficient to sustain the Network. Since resources are a key 'pull-factor' for membership, the incentive for members to join and stay in the Network would decline. It should be noted that other large civil society networks such as ACSF also felt that they would face a similar fate if funding was cut off.

In terms of sustainability, relative to other networks, CSHRN is in a more precarious position compared to organisations whose business models operate on project funding. CSHRN is highly dependent on core money and so far, it has only submitted proposals to SDC and Denmark for this money. This places the Network in a very vulnerable position if it is not able to maintain core funding in the short and medium term. The trust fund is a potential opportunity for medium term financial sustainability, if CSHRN submits a realistic and successful proposal. It is quite possible that the trust fund mechanism will naturally favour organisations that have a high capacity in proposal development.

The urban-centric implementing model of CSHRN is likely to make the Network activities more sustainable in the short to medium term, if the security dynamic continues to be unpredictable in rural areas. However, more broadly speaking, if CSHRN can't connect meaningfully with more remote areas or the traditional civil society organisations predominating in these areas, then there is less chance of a culture of human rights taking deep root in these areas.

DIHR is committed to continue to support CSHRN in a number of capacity areas. However, it is not in the interests of the long term sustainability of the Network for DIHR or the out-going Project Manager to continue to be the 'spine' and 'face' of CSHRN. To be sustainable in the long-term, it is now time for the national CSHRN staff to take over the roles and responsibilities that Mr. Sitez has been fulfilling since 2004.

Since 2004, CSHRN and other civil society networks and organisations have contributed to building a culture of human rights in Afghanistan. Although the volunteerism of activism may have decreased during this time, it has not disappeared. It is most likely that it will be a spirit of volunteerism that will lend sustainability to promoting human rights in Afghanistan in the long term rather than infinite cycles of project funding for human rights activities.

5. Lessons Learned and Best Practices for Similar Interventions in Afghanistan and Elsewhere

5.1 Lessons for the International Community

“Lessons learned” is a mantra that echoes around the global development community. However, what is of more significance is that these lessons are also transferred. Lessons from Afghanistan are important not only in the Afghan context but also to programmers and policy-makers who will engage in the Arab Spring countries. With this in mind, the Review Team wishes to highlight four key issues emerging from this External Review:¹⁸

5.1.1 Coordination among the international donor community

Despite commitments made in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, genuine donor coordination in Afghanistan has not been strong. There has been a tendency for donors to support individual organisations and initiatives, regardless of the evident pitfalls of duplication. This individualised funding mechanism has helped drive some of the ‘negative competition’ observed during this Review. This issue has been exacerbated by the enormous sums of aid money flowing into Afghanistan which as a conflict-affected and fragile state, it was ill-equipped to absorb through either government institutions or societal/NGO organisations. OECD DAC principles on how to engage in fragile states has highlighted the problem of absorption rates in such country contexts but these principles were (in part) ignored.

One respondent in this Review observed that the lack of coordination while channelling large amounts of money into Afghanistan has had dire consequences and “created a nation of beggars.” Another respondent noted that donor behaviour has nurtured a “culture of non-reciprocal entitlement.” This Review Team would propose that donors *may* have helped to generate the *privatisation of activism in Afghanistan*. By this we mean that societal initiatives to engender positive change are now partly driven by pecuniary gain. Yet private acts of courage in regards to fighting for human rights continue to exist in Afghanistan and interestingly those acts recounted to this Review Team claimed they were successful in initiating positive change because they acted on a low profile basis and were not outwardly perceived to be acting on an agenda sponsored by international donors. If there is a lesson learned here, then it is that donors may want to look more at how they

¹⁸ It should be emphasised that these key issues are observations on the international community in general and not SDC specifically.

can create a general enabling environment for human rights activists/groups to be able to take their own initiatives to address human rights concerns. As one respondent remarked to the Review Team, “civil society in Afghanistan will only survive through genuine volunteerism.”

Ten years after the fall of the Taliban and the international community appears to taking the issue of coordination somewhat more seriously in regard to working with Afghan civil society. During the review period a donor-civil society coordination meeting was convened and the Civil Society Trust Fund will be issuing calls for small proposals by the end of the year.¹⁹ However, also during this review period, the Review Team Leader was also invited to an ISAF/US - led civil society coordination initiative, which seems to indicate that even coordination efforts are fragmented. The US-funded civil society strengthening programme administered through Counterpart International will be an interesting counterpoint to the Trust Fund and other initiatives that may emerge from the Utstein+ grouping.

5.1.2 Starting at the context and working in the context

Working from the context will be high on the agenda at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. This is largely in response to global development initiatives that are seen to have failed on account of not taking the context into account and importing development models into contexts that are not ripe for such initiatives. It would be wrong to generalise and say that civil society programming in Afghanistan did not pay attention to the context. However, some donors do still need to better conceptualise in their programming how to work with indigenous structures in the country, even if these structures may not bear the hallmarks of western liberal democratic values.

5.1.3 Linking state-building and civil society support

Generally speaking, state-building and civil society support in Afghanistan has not been a sufficiently joined-up process. Instead of developing as two sides of one coin, the GoA is perceived to be competing for ‘space’ with civil society. Donors such as SDC are commended for their early support to civil society initiatives in Afghanistan and it is hoped in other contexts similar to Afghanistan, donors can establish this link early on in their programming.

¹⁹ The current contributors to the trust fund are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Other smaller donors such as Belgium are apparently considering whether joining this fund may create greater impact-to-scale for their aid money.

5.1.4 Supporting civil society as a process not a project

In the last ten years there has been a rising opportunity curve for Afghan citizens; opportunities in terms of education, civic participation, access to technology, and access to fundamental human rights. The international community have been instrumental in creating an environment where these opportunities can exist. But the environment is very fragile and there is a continued need for the international community to engage on a *long-term basis* to ensure these opportunities continue to be available, especially for women. The DIHR Vice Director, Charlotte Flindt Pederson, observed to the Review Team that “SDC has made a fantastic investment choice in CSHRN and they need to capitalise on it and make good on this investment.” To put this observation into a broader context, there is a need to continue to support civil society to flourish in Afghanistan. It is not enough for peace and security to return to the country because it will be a ‘dead peace’ if the opportunity curve declines.

6. Recommendations

6.1 Effectiveness and Relevance

The Review Team proposes twelve areas where CSHRN may improve its effectiveness and relevance:

A. The Evaluation Committee should explore more deeply into the mission, activities, and reputation of organisations seeking membership. In a highly politicised and insecure operating environment, it is critical that all members are known to share the same values and ethics. It is important that CSHRN is very transparent with new members in regards to what it can provide in terms of resources and capacity development for members to garner their own resources. Resource generation should not be the primary ‘pull-factor’ of why organisations seek membership of the Network. CSHRN may also wish to review the policy of members holding multiple memberships with different Networks as this can divide allegiances when it comes to taking a stand and issuing statements on key issues.

B. Given that pecuniary responsibilities will be transferred from DIHR to CSHRN in Phase IV, it is critical that CSHRN defines the role of CSHRN Board vis-a-vis the currently obsolete Steering Committee. It is proposed that CSHRN would benefit from an independent Steering Committee, responsible for financial oversight of the Network.

C. The current operating model is overly centralised and CSHRN could be more effective and efficient if greater authority and responsibility was decentralised to the regional offices.

D. The information management system needs improving with systematic storage of finance, administration and programmatic documents.

E. In the event that the Network procures large grants from complex donors such as the EC, it will need to ensure that it has the systems in place to manage these grants in accordance with the stipulated requirements. Of particular importance is ensuring that implementing members have the capacity to competently report and account on their activities. In this scenario, the regional offices can play an important role in ensuring that members can report as well as implement. It is proposed that all future proposals are subject to a thorough vetting process through a proposal checklist and go/no go procedure by the Secretariat senior management and include Board members in this process if the budget exceeds US\$500,000.

F. CSHRN does need to approach fund raising in a more strategic fashion and build iterative relationships with donors and view them as genuine partners. The Review Team has proposed some simple tools that CSHRN can employ to help it be more strategic such as maintaining a ‘fundraising pipeline’ and regularly updating/monitoring an ‘expressions of interest pipeline’. CSHRN can also

produce a one-page schematic on the programmatic mission of the Network to inform potential donors and interested stakeholders. The Review Team would urge CSHRN to start preparing to submit a proposal for the Civil Society Trust Fund now. This proposal should be a *rationalised version* of the proposal submitted to SDC with a more focused sectoral approach. CSHRN should not try to be ‘all things, to all people’ in Phase IV.

G. There is likely to be a continued need for DIHR to support CSHRN on fundraising and international developments on human rights and lessons learned from other countries. However, this support can largely be provided remotely.

H. It is not proposed by the Review Team that CSHRN should be subservient to donor demands but rather that greater effort is put into building iterative relationships of trust and respect between donors and CSHRN.

I. The transition of the DIHR Project Manager to an advisory role should be accompanied by a clearly articulated set of benchmarks of how the Secretariat will take full management of the five capacity areas highlighted in Section 3.1.3. The Secretariat must be given space to ‘step-up’ to its greater responsibilities.

J. There is a small but growing culture of blaming the international community for perceived mistakes that they have made in their policies and programming in Afghanistan. If this is the case, there is a correspondent responsibility on national organisations to help inform and support some of these international actors to be able to make better informed decisions. If CSHRN wishes to improve in this capacity, as the Secretariat has indicated to the Review Team, then two steps will need to be taken. First, a simple communication strategy will need to be developed that can guide how CSHRN wants to engage with the international community. The second step will be to identify a person with strong English and networking skills to undertake responsibility for this work.

K. CSHRN needs to capitalise on and publicise some of its successes and this should be outlined in both the strategic plan and in CSHRN funding proposals. These successes include the Violence against Women Campaign in Herat and the ability of the Network to provide safe dialogue spaces at a regional level.

L. It is imperative that CSHRN invests in its relationship with the MoWA’s at a national and regional level and that this relationship is marked by cooperation and trust.

6.2 Project Efficiency, Coordination and Institutional Arrangements

CSHRN can improve its project efficiency, coordination and institutional arrangements by adjusting its collective mindset and current systems in the following nineteen areas:

A. As a cost effective measure, it is proposed that CSHRN tries to form closer linkages with the Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University (ACKU) and AIHRC's resource centre which have significant and growing resources that will be relevant for CSHRN members. Generally speaking, CSHRN should try to share existing resources, where possible, rather than seek revenue to duplicate resources.

B. MoU's should be viewed as tools for genuine cooperation rather than simply dividing territory. CSHRN needs to try to achieve genuine coordination and cooperation with other networks and organisations. It is not enough for CSOs to participate in each other's events and sit on joint committees. CSHRN should make considered efforts to learn about the different activities of other Networks, such as AWN, and try to identify areas of collaboration and make this activity a feature of CSHRN strategy and planning documents. Concurrently, donors should try to seek synergies in their programming and funding rather than promoting competition over resources.

C. The logframe outputs and broader goals of the strategic plan were too ambitious for the size and capacity of the Secretariat in Phase III. It is alarming to see that although some staff growth is envisaged in Phase IV, the planned activities and outputs are even more ambitious. It is strongly recommended that CSHRN focuses on a few outcomes and sectors and executes these focus areas well in Phase IV.

D. The highly fractured and to some extent, politicised nature of broadcasting in Afghanistan is exacerbating underlying societal, ethnic, cultural and geographic fault lines. Since CSHRN is using various different radio networks in the provinces, it is cautioned that they ensure that these stations are not perceived to be affiliated with any particular country, ethnicity or political viewpoint.

It is recommended that CSHRN attempts to evaluate how effective its various radio programmes are in terms of reaching beneficiaries. It may also be useful to think about other effective mediums for reaching people such as TV dramas on human rights issues. If CSHRN wants to embark into this field, a thorough review of the available TV programmes is necessary, in order not just to become one more actor in this field.

E. CSHRN is underplaying the positive development of the Violence against Women Campaign in Herat. It is recommended that a small brochure on lessons learned and successes is produced for national and international stakeholders. Using measurement tools such as Most Significant Change stories are useful ways to gather information for such publications. It is also felt that CSHRN could

learn more from this campaign and possibly replicate the Committee on Violence against Women in other operating areas.

F. As a priority, the overall MEL and impact measurement system needs improving. It is proposed that M&E at CSHRN should be undertaken in a mindset that views this as a valuable process for learning and improving internally rather than simply satisfying donor reporting systems. The Phase IV proposal should outline steps to systemise the collection and collation of information, with one Secretariat staff member to be identified to lead on this process. This may also help to simplify reporting narratives to the donors. Training will also be required to ensure that members can adequately report on their activities.

G. CSHRN needs to *prove* that it is providing high quality inputs on human rights issues. Certain activities have been effective such as the input on the Access to Information Law but these reporting remains piecemeal and anecdotal rather than telling a broader story in regard to the aggregate quality of CSHRN's inputs on current human rights issues.

H. CSHRN was able to mobilise a broad spectrum of stakeholders at the national and regional level (particularly in Mazar) in regard to the Access to Information Law. However, while CSHRN certainly contributed to putting this issue high on the public and state agenda, the Review Team urges caution to CSHRN when reporting on this issue and share credit and stress collaboration rather than suggest that this was a solo activity of the Network. The Review Team recommends that CSHRN takes more consideration of the question of attribution in Phase IV since this has been lacking in previous phases.

I. It is understood that in Phase IV, the Network proposes to establish 'focal points' in provinces in the East, West, North and Central Highlands to enable greater outreach. In this respect, the Review Team would recommend that CSHRN initiates two steps. The first step is to clearly identify the impact population in these areas and specifically tailor the training to the needs of this group. Secondly, if CSHRN is serious about reaching to a wider population outside the provincial towns, it will need to invest heavily in building relations with local village governance structures and pre-existing CBO's. Handicap International, which works at a local level on disability rights in Western and Northern Afghanistan undertakes a careful mapping of the social capital of CBO's and receptivity of traditional and state bodies before it commits to working in new districts and villages. CSHRN may also want to conduct a rapid appraisal of this type when thinking about outreach in Phase IV.

J. Vigilance is needed to ensure that a balance is maintained between working with the supply and demand side on human rights issues. The Phase IV proposal could benefit from a clearer articulation of how CSHRN intends to work with both the GoA and civil society since this is a key element to conflict sensitivity and grounding CSHRN activities in a sustainable manner. It is recommended that

CSHRN builds in some reflection time to explore tools and lessons learned from other organisations working on this issue in fragile states.

K. In an uncertain security and funding environment, CSHRN should be thinking about *consolidating its gains rather than further expansion*. It is urged that Phase IV plans to set up an office in Southern Afghanistan and establish a regional network are reconsidered.

L. The Review Team posits that it is the responsibility of CSHRN and donors to ensure that comprehensive needs assessments are undertaken before projects are proposed and funded. Activities proposed in Phase IV should be supported by evidence of the relevance and necessity of the proposed actions.

M. There is a clear need for CSHRN staff and members to receive conflict sensitivity training. The Network may wish to approach other civil society and human rights organisations and explore joint opportunities for training with professional trainers/training organisations in the region or recruit a short term technical advisor to train CSHRN members and staff.

N. The project design process at CSHRN could be strengthened and systemised. In order to systemise and improve the current project design process at CSHRN, the Review Team has proposed a checklist tool that can be used to ensure a more comprehensive approach is taken (Annex 4). It is proposed that CSHRN re-visits the Phase IV proposal and evaluates this against the checklist tool to see if key design features such as stakeholder participation, operational analysis, and conflict sensitivity principles have been sufficiently addressed in the design.

O. So-called 'fake civil society groups' should not be turned into a metaphorical 'bogey-man' who can be blamed for a plethora of ills in state-society relations in Afghanistan. The threat of these groups may be counterbalanced by the CSOs with shared visions and ethics collaborating together in a more genuine and effective manner.

P. CSHRN should not refer to projects funded outside of SDC and Danish grants as "side projects" since this implicitly suggests a lower significance to these activities.

Q. CSHRN should always try to learn about the effectiveness of their projects. This does not always have to be through internal M&E processes. For example, the 1325 project in Parwan, Bamyan and Kabul has recently been evaluated by a set of independent evaluators; CSHRN could contact the project officer at the Ambassadors Small Grants Programme to gain some insight to the strengths and weaknesses of this project.

R. Angara articles are quite academic and specialised and thus only accessible to a small population group. Since print costs are high, it is likely to be more cost effective to limit this output in Phase IV to the CSHRN website.

S. In regard to the website, The Review Team recommends that CSHRN takes two steps. Firstly, conduct regular reviews to check that the website is accessible on low bandwidth internet connections. Secondly, CSHRN may want to explore who are the main audiences for their website. If it is predominantly Pashtu and Dari speakers, the Network may wish to focus on quality outputs in these languages rather than develop more English pages in Phase IV.

6.3 Lessons Learned and Best Practices for Similar Interventions in Afghanistan and Elsewhere

This review posits six lessons learned for the international donor community:

A. Civil society groups, national stakeholders, and international development programmers should be cautious when funding and executing urban-centric implementation models. If the security situation does worsen and development programming becomes increasingly confined to the relatively secure urban pockets, there is a risk of widening the development gap and thus the potential for conflict between urban and rural areas in Afghanistan.

B. Donors may want to look more at how they can create a *general enabling environment* for human rights activists/groups to be able to take their own initiatives to address human rights concerns rather than directly funding human rights activities. Donors should be vigilant that they do not 'privatise activism'.

C. It is a priority that the international donor community honours the spirit of cooperation enshrined in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. The establishment of trust funds may be one mechanism to do this as long as certain groups or organisations do not receive preferential treatment in the allocation of resources. The Utstein+ donors and USA need to find a means to coordinate better together.

D. It is important to programme from the context and in the context. Some donors do still need to understand how they can better conceptualise in their programming how to work with indigenous structures in the country, even if these structures may not bear the hallmarks of western liberal democratic values.

E. There is a continued need for the international donor community to support civil society to flourish in Afghanistan and treat this support as a process and not a project. The rising opportunity curve in Afghanistan, particularly for women, should continue to be enabled by the international community.

F. A number of respondents during the review period observed that Afghan civil society networks are marked by weaknesses such as a lack of collaborative spirit and a dearth of social and political

entrepreneurialism. This is apparently the case when they are compared to other networks in the Asian region. Donors may wish to collaborate to commission a project to explore this issue and generate lessons learnt from high functioning civil society networks in similar contexts in other parts of Asia.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the External Review

Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN)

External Review

Terms of Reference

Introduction

The protracted armed conflict in Afghanistan has affected all public and private sectors, inflicting tremendous damage on the economical, socio-political and cultural dimensions of the Afghan society. Therefore, a comprehensive and sustainable reconstruction of the country requires strong partnership not only between public and private actors but also an increased engagement of civil society organizations (CSO) in the reconstruction and reform process.

The reconstruction process which has been put in motion by the Bonn Agreement secures a prominent place for civil societies in the on-going state building process. The Afghan government has reflected its commitment to civil society and human rights through the Afghan Constitution, the Afghan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), as well as the National Priority Programme (NPP) “Human Rights and civic responsibilities for Afghanistan” currently under development. The SDC Medium Term Strategy for Afghanistan (MTSA) from 2008 to 2011 provides a strategic orientation framework for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to leverage its support for boosting the good governance institutions and deepening democracy in Afghanistan. In this connection, SDC financial and technical contribution to civil society promotion and gender equality is of high importance. In the past few years, SDC and other donors’ financial and technical contributions have resulted in the establishment of strong civil society forums and networks. Among others, the Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) has emerged as a coordinating and networking body for major CSOs in Afghanistan.

To ensure continuity and sustainability of the achieved results, SDC is committed to continue its support in favour of CSOs and the promotion of democratic and participatory governance at national and sub-national levels. However, being a result-oriented organization, SDC is striving for outcomes and is concerned with the long-term sustainability of the created achievements.

Background of the Project

The Civil Society and Human Rights Network (CSHRN) was founded in 2004 by a group of Afghan civil society organizations and human rights activists. The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) facilitated the creation of the network and has since then worked closely with CSHRN by providing expert assistance and capacity building in various relevant areas. Also the Society for Threatened Peoples Switzerland (STP) has been providing capacity building support since 2005. Since then, CSHRN has emerged as a credible body among national and international actors with a well functioning structure. It consists today of 80 organisations, including all the major Afghan human rights organisations, and constitutes a coordination platform for member organizations and other stakeholders in Kabul as well as in Bamyan, Nangarhar, Mazar and Herat provinces. The overall objective of CSHRN is to establish a strong human rights movement and to strengthen the rule of law, promote democracy and respect for human rights in Afghanistan.

The focus of the CSHRN work lies on further improving the general understanding of human rights, in particular the rights of women and children. SDC field monitoring missions to all provincial capitals, where CSHRN is active, have reported an overall stronger human rights awareness as well as some starting initiatives of CSHRN of joint advocacy to contribute to the improvement of the overall human rights situation. The knowledge and general awareness of its member organisations about human rights seem to have increased as well to some extent, and the dialogue on human rights among civil societies and state institutions and the parliament has been intensified and professionalized during the past years. SDC field monitoring missions have, however, also identified serious drawbacks, mainly in terms of outreach/access to the most remote and vulnerable people, monitoring of CSHRN over its members and activities, limited joint and coordinated advocacy, not enough resources (human and logistical) available for CSHRN regional hubs and limited results-based monitoring and reporting.

SDC and the Danish embassy in Kabul have been funding the network through DIHR, and the technical support of STP, since the establishment of the network. SDC has provided CHF 92,000 respectively CHF 810,000 through phase I and II (2004-2008) of the project. SDC's contribution to the current 3rd phase of the project (01.01.09 - 31.12.2011) is CHF 1,120,000. The total contribution of the Danish embassy to the network during the mentioned time is 6,304,000 DKK.

In July 2008 SDC and the Danish Embassy in Kabul jointly undertook an external evaluation of the project. According to the evaluation report, the project has been progressing to achieve its objectives. The report records specific cases where CSHRN played a role and produced specific outcomes such as promoting human rights of individual citizens, protecting freedom of speech and economical rights of a specific community, promoting gender equality, and positively influencing national policies. The report also attested a high level of satisfaction among the member organizations regarding the capacity building activities of the Network. However, the report has also raised serious concerns on certain strategic issues which include but are not limited to the lack of national capacity in the Secretariat and future sustainability of the project. CSHRN has together with DIHR closely studied the recommendations of the evaluation and has in the past three years worked

to implement these recommendations. According to the evaluation's recommendations a strategic seminar of CSHRN was conducted where the strategy of the network was updated. Furthermore a main focus has in the last three years, been to further build the capacity of local partners as well as the Secretariat – hereby increasing the sustainability of the project.

Objectives of the Review and Leading Questions

The overall objective of the present external review is to assess, from a results-based perspective, the key achievements to date of CSHRN and enable SDC, CSHRN and other key stakeholders to record specific lessons that could benefit future interventions in support and mobilization of CSOs in Afghanistan and other countries with similar conditions. The specific objectives of the external review are to assess:

(v) *To what extent are CSHRN activities attaining the intended outputs specified in the project documents logframe (effectiveness and relevance):*

- To what extent CSHRN has been consolidated as a professional and sustainable human rights network?
- Does CSHRN generally reach the targeted beneficiaries? To which extent?
- To what extent do the outputs produced through CSHRN activities contribute to strengthening the role of CSOs in promoting stability and deepening democracy in Afghanistan?
- To what extent do CSHRN activities and outputs address the national CSOs' priorities?
- What is the impact of the programme in influencing, shaping and implementing major national policies/laws related to civil/civic participation, human rights (special focus on women's rights) and gender equality?

(vi) *How efficient is the project approach to meet the expected outputs (efficiency and sustainability):*

- To what extent has CSHRN been successful in achieving its planned outputs to-date?
- Are CSHRN activities/interventions conflict-sensitive (*do least harm* principle)? To what extent? To what extent has CSHRN met the special needs of women in its capacity building and advocacy activities?
- What are the major external and internal issues influencing *the achievement* of project outputs and how can risks mitigating procedures be further strengthened?
- How is the security situation influencing the work and therefore the results of the project in the different target areas?

(vii) *Coordination and Institutional arrangements*

- To what extent do CSHRN activities and outputs duplicate or compete with other international initiatives at sub-national level?

- To what extent has CSHRN positioning enabled the optimal use of the comparative advantages of donors' contribution in support of civil societies?
 - What efforts/synergies have been developed/or are possible between CSHRN and other institutions/organizations such as ACSF, AIHRC, HRSU (within the MoJ), the police, Human Rights units within MoI and MoFA and other organizations working in the same field?
 - What are the institutional aspects which have significantly progressed during this project's phase, and those to particularly look at/change?
 - To what extent has the coordination and cooperation between human rights and civil society organisations been strengthened due to CSHRN?
- (viii) ***Document lessons learned and best practices for future similar intervention in Afghanistan and elsewhere***
- What are the main lessons learned from CSHRN implementation that could benefit future intervention in a conflict /post conflict and politically charged milieu, such as Afghanistan?
 - In view of the prevailing conflict situation in Afghanistan, what are the specific conflict mitigation considerations within the work of CSHRN?
 - What are the chances that the accomplishments and outputs will be sustained in the future? What strategic and operational measures need to be taken in order to sustain them?
 - Are CSHRN and its member organizations likely to have the capacity to mobilize resources (human, financial) to pursue/secure the outputs in the future? What would be possible modalities to move towards a self sustaining network?
 - How is the current monitoring and evaluation mechanism assessed? Does this mechanism serve as a feedback system for improving project implementation?
 - Provide recommendations on required changes to the project design to address the current implementation environment and shortcomings identified within the project.

The Scope of the Review

The external review will cover CSHRN activities at Kabul and regional levels (Central, Northern Western and Eastern Regions of Afghanistan), therefore the review team should include in their work plan suggestions on how they would sample provinces to ensure representation of the geographic areas that CSHRN covers. It is suggested that at least to regional provinces should be included in the work plan. The review will cover the project period from January 2009 until the end of the first half of 2011.

The review will assess the achievements of the project in terms of its contribution to the outputs and outcome identified in the attached logframe (see attachment 1). Likewise, the review should make specific recommendations on adjustments to be made in the programme to reflect the challenges identified within the programme as well as changes that may have occurred or may occur in the future in the overall operating milieu since the last three years.

Methodology

The review will apply a stakeholder and human rights-based approach where all stakeholders (groups and individuals), who affect and/or are affected by the project activities and outputs, are involved in the analysis. Furthermore, the review will take into consideration the socio-economical and political context, which affects the overall performance of the project outputs and results on the central and provincial levels.

The review will be conducted in an objective, sensitive and independent manner with varied and balanced consideration of both positive/negative aspects and areas in which significant improvements are required. It has to be underlined that the findings and recommendations of the review will reflect the views of the review team and will not be influenced by the need of CSHRN or its donors. Though, CSHRN and its donors will be in the position to propose certain corrections, if factual errors are contained in the review draft report. Nevertheless, the final decision on what to reflect or not lies with the review team, being solely responsible for the report and its recommendations.

The CSHRN Secretariat will act as focal point for the review team and will provide it with the available written documentations, which may include but are not limited to:

- CSHRN strategic documents that include its vision and mission statements, policy papers and multi-year strategies.
- Project document phases I, II and III.
- Report of 2008 evaluation.
- Project progress and financial reports.
- Project annual reports
- Project monitoring reports,
- Minutes of donors meetings, project (steering) committee,
- MoUs and grant documents
- ToRs of the Secretariat staff including regional coordinators and assistants
- Important press releases of CSHRN
- List with member organisations of CSHRN
- Other documents related to the exercise and available with CSHRN and its donors.

The review team will be expected to prepare and submit to SDC and CSHRN an outline of the methodology that will be followed by the review. The outline shall contain timetable for the review, work plan, detail of the approach on how the review will be carried out, sampling procedures including field visits to provinces, etc.

CSHRN Secretariat will facilitate all the requested meetings with donor agencies, governmental institutions, member agencies and target beneficiary communities at Kabul and provincial levels. The team will present its primarily

conclusions prior to the end of the review exercise for obtaining stakeholders reaction to these observation and conclusions.

The review team should use a variety of methods to ensure that the data and information is valid, including triangulation. Precise methods of validation must be detailed in the work plan. The review team should also strive for involvement of a broad range of stakeholders. Toward this end, the identification of the stakeholders, including civil society organizations that are not currently members of CSHRN, government representation at Kabul and provincial level should be taken into consideration.

Expected Outputs

Following a briefing meeting in Kabul at the beginning of the review, as well as a debriefing with all stakeholders at the end of the review mission, the team will submit its draft report that intends to solicit stakeholders' reactions and comments. Upon the receipt of CSHRN and its donors' comments, the team will revise the draft and produce a final report. The final report will be submitted to SDC and CSHRN for further sharing with relevant partners no later than two weeks after the receipt of the donors' comments. The report will satisfy all requirements and objectives established in these ToRs. The final report will contain, *inter alia*, an executive summary (no more than 5 pages), specific findings, conclusions and recommendations. The recommendations should be presented in a format that can be transferred into practice by SDC and CSHRN. The report should not exceed 30 standard pages (excluding annexes).

The Review Team

The review team should include international and national experts and be gender balanced. An international development expert will lead the review team. The team leader should have past experience in monitoring and evaluation in conflict and post conflict situations outside his/her home country as well as professional experience in working with civil society organizations. Preferably, the team leader should have past experience in local governance, organizational development and capacity building fields. Knowledge of the South Asian Region, particularly Afghanistan, is considered a strong asset, as well as experience of human rights in other Islamic countries. The team leader should have at least 5 years related experience and at least a Master degree in Human Rights, Development, Law, Political Science, Social Science or related area, plus 3 years related experience in evaluation of development projects.

Two national experts will be also part of the review team. A national expert with experience in monitoring and evaluation, preferably of similar projects and a second national expert mostly versed in translation/interpretation from/to English to/from Afghan national languages. The team should be familiar with the outcome monitoring approaches and able to analyze Gender and disadvantageous issues, under a conflict-sensitive and human rights-based lens. The two national experts

should have at least Bachelor's degree in a related field and a minimum of 3 years of relevant experience.

Duration

The total duration of the mission should be approximately five calendar weeks, starting from the date of arrival to Afghanistan. The review work will be conducted in three phases.

The first phase of *Desk Review* will start as soon as the review team is assigned and will take maximum one calendar week. During this 7-days phase the review team will review the relevant documents, will prepare the work plan and will develop the review approach. The second phase will start from the submission of work plan and other pre-reviews deliverables by the review team and will end with the presentation of the draft report and debriefing session with SDC and CSHRN. During this phase, the review team will work six days per week (Fridays are day-off) to complete the assignment in three weeks. The third phase will consist of the period allotted for the finalization of the report, upon the receipt of comments from SDC, CSHRN and other partner organizations. Throughout this final week, the review team can decide to work virtually, if the team leader departs from Afghanistan prior to submitting the final report. The team will have two weeks for submitting the final report, though they will be entitled for one week remuneration.

While the team leader remains responsible for delivery of quality outputs and reports, CSHRN Secretariat, supported by SDC, will be responsible for organizing and facilitating the review. The review team will be provided with transportation at SDC expense, including air transportation to provinces. Printing and internet facility will be provided by CSHRN and SDC as needed.

Overall security arrangements will be organized by CSHRN. However, as security in Afghanistan is a concern and since unforeseen events can occur, the evaluation team is at all times responsible for its own personal security and safety. The evaluators will therefore have to sign a waiver of responsibility upon arrival in country.

Please send your application to Kabul@sdc.net by 20 August 2011.

Annex 2: List of Interviewees

Name	Position and organization
Abdul Bari	Head of Programmes of SDC
Abdul Haque Hanif	Member of the Justice directorate of Herat province
Abdul Karim Mohammad Yar	Member of the culture and information directorate of Herat province
Abdul Khaliq	Head of Gender and Human Rights of the 606 Ansar zonal troops
Abdul Rahman Bamyani	Head of Communication Tafahum Organization, Bamyan
Abdul Raziq	Head of Gender and Human Rights in the Western Zone
Abdullh Shayagan	Independent Journalist and Photographer, Bamyan
Ahmad Jawid Shekib	Peace & Justice Foundation, and member of CSHRN Statement Committee
Ahmad Seyar Lalee	Programme Officer CSHRN
Ali Ahmand Kawa	Head of Advocacy and Social Development Center (SDAO)
Ali Hikmat	Executive Director, Justice and Legal Services Organization (JLSO)
Ali Jan Fahim	Administration/Finance Officer CSHRN Bamyan Office
Ali Joma Mozafari	Reformers Civil Center (RCC)
Arifa	Judge in secondary court of Herat province
Arvind Das	Country Director, Handicap International Afghanistan
Aziz Gul Mohammadi	3 rd year student of Bamyan University, Agriculture Department
Aziza Khair Andish	Regional Coordinator Western Zone CSHRN
Azizullah Rahfee	Afghanistan Civil Society Foundation (ACSF)
Bary Salaam	Director of Good Morning Afghanistan (GMA)
Bomani Afghan	Bamyan University Student, Agriculture Department
Charlotte Flindt Pedersen	Deputy Director/OIC International Operation DIHR
Daud Munir	Professor of Literature, Herat University
Esmail Zaki	Regional Coordinator for Central Zone
Farid Hamidi	Commissioner AIHRC
Fasila	Human Rights Officer UNAMA Bamyan
Fatima Alireza	Bamyan University Student, Social Sciences Department
Fatima Haidari	Bamyan University Student, Dari Department
Fatima Jafari	Member and Secretary of Heart Provincial Council
Fatima Rezayee	Journalist in Bamyan
Fawad Ahmadi	Member of the independent media of South Asia
Feriba Hasan	Bamyan University Student, Education Department
Ferozan Arezo	Resources Center Officer CSHRN
Friba Behzad	11 Grade Student, Bamyan High School
Gulsum Sediqi	Afghan Women Layer Foundation (AWLF)
Habiba Sarabi	Governor of Bamyan Province
Hanifa Sadaat Husaini	2 nd year student of Bamyan University, Education Department
Hassan Ali Faiz	Head of Human Rights Unit of Ministry of Justice
Hassan Wafaey	Senior Research Manager, Democracy International
Ibrahim Tawalla	Member of Bamyan Writers Association
Jacob Faber	First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy in Kabul-Afghanistan
Jasveen Ahluwalia	(Ex) Manager of Women's Empowerment Programme, CARE

	Afghanistan
Jay Lamey	Publications Manager, AREU
Jen Rowell	Officer of CARE International in Kabul Afghanistan
Katayoon Tamana	Deputy of the women rights protection section of the AIHRC in Herat province
Khalida Khorsand	Violence Deduction Training Officer CSHRN Western Zone
Khalil Ahmad Parsa	Youth National Movement
Lailuma Nomani	Deputy Director of Women Affairs Department of Herat, and Director for Development Council for Women in Herat
Lal Gul	Director of Human Rights Organization and former Board Member of CSHRN
Mahmood Rahmani	Rahnawardan Social Center (RSC)
Malik Sitez	Head of Programs CSHRN
Mariam Nasiri	3 rd year student of Bamyan University, Agriculture Department
Massoud Azram	Senior M&E Advisor, CARE Afghanistan
Mawlawi Said Ahmad Husaini	Officer of Haje and Awqaf department of Herat province
Mir Ahmad Joyenda	Board member of Culture and Civil Society Foundation and Deputy Director of Communications and Advocacy, AREU
Mohammad Anwar Mateen	Representative of Herat Governor Office
Mohammad Faqiri	Student of Herat University
Mowlawi Said Ad. Akhondzada	Member of the clergies and scientists of Herat
Nahid	Officer of Heart Education Department
Naim Nazari	Executive Coordinator, CSHRN
Nasim Saba	Publicans Officer, CSHRN
Nazar Ahmad Shah	Senior Development Officer, Embassy of Denmark in Afghanistan
Nazir Ahmad Raha	Youth Intellectuals Association
Nikolaj Kniaz	OIC, Human Rights Section UNAMA Herat
Nila	Head of Tahmani Union, Herat
Noor Saba	Advocacy Department Officer, CSHRN
Qamargul Sharifi	Bamyan University Student, Dari Department
Rahima Yosufi	(Ex)Deputy-Director of Women Affairs in Herat
Ramin Ahmadi	Administration/Finance Officer, CSHRN Western Zone
Rebecca Gang	Lawyer / Lecturer in Legal Studies, American University, Kabul
Roqia Hussaini	Bamyan University Student
S. M. Hussain Payam	Head of Humanitarian Coordination Organisation , Bamyan
Sahera Sadaat	3 rd year student of Bamyan University, Agriculture Department
Said Abdul Qadir Rahimi	Regional Manager, AIHRC in Western Zone, Herat
Sakina Husaini	Member of Herat Provincial Council
Samira Hamidi	Director, Afghanistan Women's Network (AWN)
Sayed Khalil Moaied	Coordination Foundation for Justice and Advocacy for Women Rights (AWRF)
Sediqullah Tauhidi	Executive Director, Afghanistan Media Watch
Shabnam Simin	Director, Nasli Naw Organization, Herat
Shafiqa Quraishi	Head of Human Rights and Gender Unit, Ministry of Interior
Shahla Farid	Faculty of Law at Kabul University and 1325 UN Resolution Support Group member
Shaima Tahiri	12th Grade Student, Bamyan High School
Somaia Ramiz	Member of CSHRN, Western Zone, Herat
Somaia Ramiz	Director Naw Andishan Cultural and Social Center, Herat
Soraya Parlika	Director Afghanistan Women's Union and Board Member of CSHRN

Suzanne Schmeidl	Advisor, The Liaison Office
Tahira Popal	Human Rights Officer (UNAMA)
Tayeba Khawari	Youth Cultural Affairs and Resource Centre CSHRN Bamyan Office
Wael Ibrahim	Consultant, ACBAR
Wahid Shah Amin	Student of Herat University
Walter Bresseleers	Civil Society Trust Fund, Cardno Emerging Markets & British Council
Wazir Ahmad Khorami	Deputy Director CSHRN
Yama Salik	Director, Organization for Afghan Social Development (OASD)
Zahra Abdullahi	Director of Bamyan Women's Association

Annex 3: List of CSHRN National-Level Committee Membership

No	Name of committee	Contact Person	Contact
1	Member of the Advisory Board on the Labour Law implementation	Naim Nazari CSHRN coordinator	0783565457
2	Member of the Peace Watch Committee in OSA	Naim Narari CSHRN coordinator	0783565457
3	Member of the Civil Society Committee for Bonn Conference	Wazir Ahmad Khorami CSHRN Liaison Office	0700260942
4	Member of the High Media Council	Naim Nazari CSHRN coordinanor	0783565457
5	Member of the Steering Committee on Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice	Naim Nazari CSHRN coordinator	0783565457
6	Member of the Committee to Empower the Private Sector and Civil Society	Naim Nazari CSHRN coordinator	0783565457
7	Member of the ICCO Platform On Conflict Transformation and development	Ahmad Seyar Lalee Program officer	0786009112

Annex 4: Project Design Checklist

Elements contributing to a well designed project	Status/Comments
Contextual analysis highlighting underlying causes of the problem to be address through the project?	
Community/stakeholder participation in design process?	
A sound needs assessment of the proposed implementation (who has identified the need for this intervention? What other organisations/actors are working in this area? What are they doing? Is there scope for collaboration?)	
Have you identified areas to 'scale-up for impact' i.e. ways to work with others to leverage change?	
Have conflict sensitivity principles been incorporated?	
Operational analysis of the demographic, social, political and geographic realities of the project locations?	
Has an institutional assessment been undertaken of the members implementing and reporting capacities?	
Has attention paid to Gender Equity and Diversity (GED)?	
Is the intended project fully linked to the overarching CSHRN long term strategy? How?	
Clearly identified impact population?	
A clearly identified communication strategy to convey the impact of the project to national and international stakeholders?	
Has a sound and systematic M&E system been developed that focuses on the learning, multiplier effects and impacts of the project activities?	
Social change is messy and complex. ARE CSHRN staff, members and stakeholders for the social change that the project is initiating?	
How will the project activities be sustained?	
What is your exit strategy?	
What are the risks associated with the intervention and how can they be mitigated?	

Annex 5: Proposal Checklist

Purpose: The purpose of this checklist is to support the senior Secretariat management (and CSHRN Board, when appropriate) to make an informed go/no go decision before a proposal is submitted and ensure clear accountability for proposals submitted by CSHRN. The Executive Coordinator of CSHRN (or designate) will sign funding agreements only when the checklist and go/no go processes are completed.

1. General

1.A Does the proposal follow the required donor formatting rules (font, spacing, page limit etc)?	Yes / No
1.B Does CSHRN or members have previous experience working with this donor or contractor?	Yes / No
1.C Did finance and programme staff (and regional staff, where appropriate) work collectively on this proposal?	Yes / No

2. Fit with CSHRN mission

2.A Does this project contribute to the CSHRN mission goal?	Yes / No
2.B Does this project augment other CSHRN project work?	Yes / No
2.C Has a target impact group been identified	Yes / No
2.D Has a clear communication and outreach strategy been identified?	Yes / No
2.E Has an impact measurement system been identified?	Yes / No
2.F Are there staff capacity building opportunities in this project?	Yes / No

3. Finance, compliance, HR

3.A Are there match funds in this proposal?	Yes / No
If yes, what % of the grant will be match costs?	
Are match funds covered with core, project	

money or in-kind?	
Is there minimal risk for the commitment of the match funds?	Yes / No
3.B Will CSHRN be sub-contracting to others in this grant?	Yes / No
If yes, have sub-contractors been subject to a selection and vetting process?	Yes / No
3.C Is CSHRN acting as a partner or sub-grantee in this grant?	Yes / No
If yes, are partnership agreements in place?	Yes / No
3.D Have adequate/appropriate support costs been built into the budget proposal?	Yes / No
3.E is there an audit requirement for this grant?	Yes / No
If yes, does this requirement fit into the CSHRN organisational audit cycle?	Yes / No
3.F Has a project staffing plan been developed?	Yes / No

Go / No Go Decision

Names of decision making team:

Decision:

Comments

Annex 6: Expression of Interest (EOI) Pipeline Matrix

An EOI pipeline is used as a tool to monitor, track and respond to any EOI's to work with CSHRN. This is different to a finding pipeline because it relates to expressions of interest in regard to actors or organisations that may approach CSHRN for a partnership, joint advocacy work or requests of a technical nature to the network. By monitoring and regularly updating this matrix, CSHRN efficiently manage and respond to these requests. While one member of the Secretariat such as Mr.Lalee should take overall responsibility for updating this matrix, it will be the wider responsibility of the Secretariat and Board to use this routinely as a tool to maintain relationships and track pertinent trends in EOI's to the Network. An example of an EOI matrix is below.

#	Contact lead at CSHRN	Contact person/organisation of EOI	Date of EOI	Description of EOI	Follow-up action taken/ to be taken
1					
2					

Annex 7: Funding Pipeline Matrix

A funding pipeline is a tool used to help systemise, track and follow-up on funding opportunities in a strategic manner. It can also help in ensuring that concepts and proposals do fit together in a strategic fashion so that CSHRN activities are coordinated and working to scale. While one member of the Secretariat such as Mr.Lalee should take overall responsibility for updating this matrix, it will be the wider responsibility of the Secretariat and regional offices to ensure that all relevant information is provided to keep the matrix current and follow-up on concepts and proposal in a timely manner. An example of a funding pipeline is below.

#	Donor	Budget US\$	Core or Project funds	Duration of Grant	Status of concept/ Proposal	CSHRN lead person	Checklist Go-no go status	Expected result date	% likelihood outcome *
1									
2									

** It is useful for some organisation in fundraising strategising to assign a subjective percentage on the likelihood that they think they will be successful in each proposal*

Annex 8: A Brief Review of the Training Modules Prepared by CSHRN

There is a number of training modules prepared and published by the CSHRN. The training modules have been used by the CSHRN for the training purposes to the training of the trainers and in the mean time some member organizations reportedly have also demanded and used them.

1. Training Module on Transitional Justice

This training module has been written by four Afghan writers (M. Hussain Saramad, A. Jawid Shekib, Ihsan Qani, and Sohaila Weda Khamosh) making the transitional justice research group from the member organizations of CSHRN in 2011 in 5000 units. The contents of the modules are framed into four chapters in 172 pages:

- General concept and meanings of transitional justice
- History and experience of transitional justice
- Role players of transitional justice
- Opportunities and challenges of transitional justice in Afghanistan
- Sources

The training module explains the program for training in each chapter, its subject, objective, and aims. Besides the module in each chapter, schedules a specific length of time, training methodology and activities. Each chapter contains also a summary of its contents.

2. Training Module on Conflict Transformation

The training module has been written in 2009 by four Afghan writers (Shor Angiz, Husain Saramad, A. Jawid Shekib, Khalil Farzam) who were the members of CSHRN and it was published in 5000 units. The module contains 147 pages and six sections which are divided on the subjects of:

- What is the conflict, its kinds, and what are its causes?
- General Issues of conflict, Internal links of war in Afghanistan
- Dimensions of ideological War in Afghanistan
- Effective International Conflicts in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan in One-polar World

The training module explains the program for training in each chapter, its subject, objective, and aims. Besides the module in each chapter, schedules a specific length of time, training methodology and activities. Each chapter contains also a results part.

3. Debate Manual on Women Rights

The Debate Manual has been written in 2007 by four Afghan writers (Mahnaz Sadiqi, Azizullah Abdullah, Ahmad Siyar Lalee, Azar Yone Mateen) who were the members of CSHRN and its Secretariat. The manual was published in 5000 units. The module contains 92 pages in three main sections which are divided on the subjects of:

- Women Problems (Training Section)
- Civil and Political Rights
- Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The Debate Manual explains the program for debate in each section, its subject, objective, and aims. Besides the module in each chapter, schedules a specific length of time, training methodology and activities.

4. Educational Manual on Human Rights

The Manual has been prepared in 2005 by three Afghan writers (Rawshan Selan, Abdul Wahid Zia Mobaligh, Mohammad Akbar Sarwar), and Manuella Weliams (Swiss), and Malik Setiz (Denmark). The manual was published in 2500 units. The manual contains 260 pages in six main sections which are divided on the subjects of:

- Historical progress of Human Rights, Rights and Human Rights
- International Declaration for civic and political rights, Rule of Law, Freedom of Expression, The will of people is the base of government, Just Trial Right, Convention of removal of torture and any kind of insulting behavior.
- Introduction of economic, social, and cultural rights, Child Right, Education Right, Work Right, Ownership Right, Human Rights and Religion, Civil Society.
- Convention on removal of all kinds of discrimination against women, Gender, 1325 Declaration of the Security Council about Women, Marriage from the Islamic view point, International Conventions and Afghanistan Civic Laws, Violence, Family Violence.
- Principals for adult education, Training Plan.
- Annexes; Universal Human Rights Declaration.

The Manual explains the program for training in each section, its subject, objective, and aims. Besides the manual in each chapter, schedules a specific length of time, training methodology and activities

Annex 9: Project Logic Model

